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Over the past 25 years, corporate tax rates in Europe show a remarkable downward
trend. In 1983, the mean statutory corporate tax rate of 13 Western European
countries accounted to 49.2%. As of 2008, the average tax rate of these countries
had eroded to 27.2%. Despite the fact that it may signiﬁcantly aﬀect the ability
of national governments to run independent ﬁscal policies, no uniﬁed approach to
determine the driving forces behind the decline of corporate tax levels has emerged.
Two mostly independent strands of literature have dealt with the determinants of
corporate taxes. The ﬁrst one asks whether the increasing openness of economies,
in particular the enhanced mobility of capital, leads to lower corporate tax rates.
Slemrod (2004) uses a discrete indicator of trade openness and ﬁnds a negative
impact of trade openness on the statutory company tax rate. Similarly, Rodrik
(1997) as well as Winner (2005) provide evidence suggesting that higher capital
mobility is associated with lower company tax rates. The ﬁnding that governments
in more open economies set lower taxes on corporate income is also supported by
studies using some index of the degree of liberalization of international capital
transactions to measure openness such as Swank and Steinmo (2002) and Schwarz
(2007).
A second strand of literature models governments as agents behaving strategically
when setting their tax policies. This gives rise to tax reaction functions describing
optimal responses to tax policies of competing countries. For positively sloped
2reaction functions, governments will ﬁnd it optimal to reduce their tax rates in
reaction to tax cuts by competitors. Consequently, the tax competition literature
has asked whether the strategic interaction among governments can explain the
decline of corporate tax rates in Europe as a ‘race to the bottom’, fuelled by
individual governments’ incentives to lure investors by competitive tax policies.
In a recent study, Devereux et al. (2008) ﬁnd support for the tax competition
hypothesis for a sample of OECD countries, and other contributions have come to
similar conclusions (Redoano, 2007; Egger et al., 2007; Davies and Voget, 2008).
Compared to the contributions discussing the role of economic and ﬁnancial open-
ness, the tax competition literature is methodologically more involved. Most stud-
ies try to identify the tax competition eﬀect from a static model capturing the
interdependency of national tax policies by a spatial lag of other countries’ tax
rates. However, the resulting endogeneity problem has been found diﬃcult to
solve, in particular because of a lack of convincing instrumental variables. More-
over, the static tax competition model ignores the fact that national tax policies
are often characterized by substantial inertia, and that the evolution of corporate
tax rates for individual countries as well as for the European average seems to be
driven by a sluggish adjustment to shocks.
The contribution of thus study is twofold. Firstly, it provides a synthesis of previous
research by carefully investigating the role of economic or ﬁnancial openness and
strategic tax competition in an integrated framework. Secondly, we allow for a
dynamic adjustment of tax rates to tax policies of competing countries as well as
3to general economic shocks. This enables us to distinguish between strategic (short-
run) tax competition eﬀects and long-run eﬀects working through the interplay of
direct tax competition and the sluggish adjustment of taxes over time. All this is
done while netting out country-speciﬁc as well as period-speciﬁc eﬀects. Hence,
in contrast to most related studies, we fully separate common shocks potentially
aﬀecting tax policies in all countries from the country-speciﬁc and time-variant
eﬀects of interest.
Our data set covers up to 32 countries from 1983 until 2006, which is by far the
most comprehensive data among all available studies on corporate taxation in
Europe. To investigate the role of openness, tax competition, common shocks, and
dynamic adjustment on corporate tax setting we estimate a series of panel data
models, ranging from one allowing only for country-speciﬁc and period-speciﬁc
eﬀects to a dynamic model accounting for openness, tax competition and further
controls. Our main ﬁndings are the following. First of all, economic or ﬁnancial
openness do not contribute to explaining corporate tax rates once we allow for more
general speciﬁcations. In contrast, competition over statutory tax rates is found to
signiﬁcantly aﬀect national tax policies. Since current rates are strongly aﬀected
by past levels, the moderate short-run eﬀects of tax competition contribute to
substantial multiplier eﬀects for permanent changes in exogenous characteristics.
For instance, in a stylized two-country example, the results of our dynamic ﬁxed
eﬀects estimation would predict a decrease of the percentage of the population
below 15 years by one percentage point in one country to have the following eﬀects:
4in the short run, the statutory tax rate in the aﬀected country will be reduced
by about 0.44 percentage points. In the long run, however, the model predicts
a reduction by 1.73 percentage points. Moreover, our model predicts that tax
competition transmits the tax-reducing eﬀect of the original shock to the other
country. In the long run, even if its exogenous characteristics are unchanged, this
country will reduce its own tax rate by 0.58 percentage points.
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that neither increased openness nor stronger
competition for capital have caused the recent decline of corporate tax rates.
Rather, it seems that changes in fundamental variables and permanent shocks
like, for instance, the integration of the former communist countries of Eastern
Europe, have been the ultimate forces driving down corporate tax rates. In a dy-
namic framework, the important role of tax competition turns out to be that it
aﬀects the long-run multipliers of permanent shocks. Hence, if the most relevant
shocks to the fundamental variables are such that they tend to depress corporate
tax rates, the presence of tax competition among countries will contribute to lower
long-run equilibrium tax levels. Until the system has fully adjusted to the new
equilibrium, the model predicts a steady decline of average tax rates and substan-
tial heterogeneity among countries: while countries directly aﬀected by shocks are
predicted to cut their taxes sharply, unaﬀected countries should reduce their rates
at a slower pace. This prediction seems to be well in line with the actual tax setting
behavior of national governments in Europe. For instance, after the breakdown of
the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989, the Western European countries
5located at the former border between Western and Eastern Europe reduced their
statutory tax rates signiﬁcantly more than countries less directly aﬀected by the
integration shock. By the year 2000, the diﬀerent pace in terms of rate cutting tax
reforms between border and non-border countries amounted to a relative reduction
of statutory rates in border countries of about 10 percentage points (Overesch and
Rincke, 2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss recent
trends in corporate tax rates in Europe. The estimation approach and the data
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Trends in corporate taxation in Europe
Figure 1 summarizes the trends in corporate taxation in Europe since 1983. In the
top left-hand panel, the graph shows the statutory corporate tax rate (STR). This is
the statutory headline rate of the corporate income tax adjusted for surcharges and
the average of local income tax rates. Furthermore, the ﬁgure shows cross-country
averages for the eﬀective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and the eﬀective average
tax rate (EATR). The eﬀective tax rates are calculated following Devereux and
Griﬃth (2003). Unlike the statutory tax rate, eﬀective tax rates reﬂect all relevant
income and non-income taxes imposed on corporate investments as well as all rules
aﬀecting the tax base.1
1We refer the reader to Section 3.3 for a detailed description of eﬀective tax rates.
6Figure 1: Trends in corporate taxation in Europe, 1983-2006
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Graphs for average tax rates show unweighted averages. Countries in sample (period) are: Austria
(83-06), Belgium (83-06), Switzerland (83-06), Cyprus (91-06), Denmark (83-06), Spain (91-06),
Finland (83-06), France (83-06), Germany (83-06), Greece (90-06), Ireland (83-06), Iceland (90-
06), Italy (83-06), Luxembourg (83-06), Malta (94-06), Netherlands (83-06), Norway (90-06),
Portugal (90-06), Turkey (96-06), Sweden (83-06), UK (83-06). Eastern Europe: Bulgaria (93-
06), Czech Rep. (92-06), Estonia (95-06), Croatia (95-06), Hungary (92-06), Latvia (95-06),
Lithuania (95-06), Poland (92-06), Romania (94-06), Slovenia (95-06), Slovak Rep. (92-06).
Figure 1 shows the striking decline of both statutory and eﬀective tax rates since
1983. Starting in the mid 1980s with tax reforms in the UK, statutory tax rates
went down considerably, whereas the eﬀective marginal tax rates only decreased
slightly due to tax base broadening. During the early 1990s, countries in northern
Europe reduced their corporate tax levels by introducing some form of dual-income
tax systems, which impose signiﬁcantly lower tax rates on capital income relative
to labor income.
Since the fall of the iron curtain, the former communist countries in Eastern Europe
7have become increasingly popular as locations for multinationals. The graphs show
that the countries in Eastern Europe have signiﬁcantly contributed to the overall
decline of tax rates.2 In 2006, the average statutory tax rate of the 11 considered
former transition economies in Eastern Europe amounted to 19.3%. In comparison,
the average of the remaining European countries was 27.5%, a diﬀerence of 8.2
percentage points.
In the lower left-hand panel, the graph shows a less dramatic decline in eﬀective
marginal tax rates in comparison to the other tax measures. This is due to several
reforms broadening the tax base, compensating for part of the cutting of statutory
tax rates. Overall, the negative trend reveals that cuts in statutory tax rates have
only partly been compensated by base broadening. Moreover, several countries,
such as Germany in the late 1990s, have reduced the eﬀective marginal tax rates
by means of an abolishment of non-income taxes.
Regarding the evolution of tax rates over time, Figure 1 suggests that actual tax
policies are strongly aﬀected by inherited tax levels. Therefore, apart from depen-
dence of tax rates across countries, our empirical approach to explaining corporate
tax setting in Europe also considers auto-regression in tax rates.
2Note that the eﬀective tax rates of the Eastern European countries do not reﬂect the various
tax incentives such as tax holidays available before joining the EU.
83 Empirical approach
3.1 Empirical models for the corporate tax rate
The literature has proposed various empirical models to explain corporate tax
setting by national governments. Since our aim is to provide a synthesis and
reassessment of the various issues discussed in previous work, we brieﬂy discuss a
number of alternative models.
Before turning to more elaborate models, it seems useful to start with a basic model
that accounts only for common time eﬀects and time-constant country character-
istics. While we capture the common time eﬀects either by a linear time trend or
by a full series of period (year) eﬀects, denoted by θt, the time-invariant character-
istics enter the model through country ﬁxed eﬀects, ci. Our baseline model for the
corporate tax rate, τit, of country i = 1,...,N in period t = 1984,...,2006 thus
reads
τit = θt + ci + uit, (1)
where uit is a residual. The next step is to include a country’s openness as a
measure of globalization, git, providing us with the estimation equation
τit = γgit + θt + ci + uit. (2)
Equation (2) allows us to check for an independent eﬀect of openness on corporate
tax rates once the impact of common shocks and country-speciﬁc eﬀects is netted
9out. The globalization eﬀect is expected to carry a negative sign, as a country’s
openness should limit the government’s ability to tax mobile capital.
We then proceed by adding a number of control variables which vary over time and
might therefore aﬀect the tax rate even though time-constant country characteris-
tics are absorbed by the ﬁxed eﬀects. As in most empirical studies of corporate tax
setting, we include country size, measured by the log of GDP. Furthermore, the age
structure of the population could inﬂuence tax policy due to budgetary eﬀects of
demographic changes. We therefore consider the fraction of young (below 15 years)
and elderly (above 65 years) people as additional control variables. An increasing
gap between personal and corporate income taxes may lead to an incentive to defer
taxes by means of excessive retention of capital income at the corporate level. As
a consequence, the corporate income tax may serve as a backstop for the personal
income tax level within the tax system of a country (Slemrod, 2004), and we ac-
count for this by including the top personal income tax rate (PITR) among our
controls. Denoting the vector of control variables by xit, the model accounting for
openness, common time eﬀects, country eﬀects, and time-varying controls3 reads
τit = γgit + xitβ + θt + ci + uit. (3)
The next step in building a more comprehensive model for the corporate tax rate
is to account for the substantial inertia in corporate tax rates by including a lagged
3We use lagged levels for GDP, openness and the variables describing the age distribution
of the population to account for the time lag between the political decision regarding taxes and
their actual implementation. However, using contemporary values for all control variables does
not aﬀect any of our ﬁndings.
10dependent variable, τi,t−1,
τit = λτi,t−1 + γgit + xitβ + θt + ci + uit. (4)
Note that the model now implies a dynamic adjustment to shocks as well as per-
manent changes in the exogenous characteristics.
Finally, the most general model that we are going to look at includes not only a
country’s own lagged tax rate, but also the lagged rate of neighbors. Hence, we
allow for potential strategic tax competition eﬀects. The tax competition eﬀect
is deﬁned as a linear combination of other countries’ tax rates in t − 1, τ−i,t−1 =
N P
j=1
wijτj,t−1, with weights wij ≥ 0 if i 6= j and wij = 0 if i = j, providing us with
τit = λτi,t−1 + φτ−i,t−1 + γgit + xitβ + θt + ci + uit. (5)
We expect the impact of the tax competition eﬀect to be positive, indicating that
governments adjust their own tax rate towards levels chosen by neighboring coun-
tries.
In any case, we assume ci and uit to be i.i.d. across i and t, independent of each
other and among themselves. To purge any cross sectional or time correlations from
the error term is justiﬁed because the scope of the full model is to directly estimate
time correlations (through the lagged dependent variable) and spatial correlations
(through the spatial variable).
11To obtain the long-run representation of the full model, we ﬁrst rewrite (5) in the
following form
τt = (λI + φW)τt−1 + γgt + xtβ + θt + c + ut, (6)
where τt, τt−1, gt, θt, c and ut are N × 1 vectors, xt is a N × 4 matrix and W is a
N × N matrix. By recursive substitution, one can solve backwards to obtain





s(γgt + xtβ + θt + c + ut). (7)
We refer the reader to Korniotis (2008) for a detailed discussion of the long-run
representation. For our purpose, it is most important to note that, along with a
number of regularity assumptions on W, we need to assume |λ| + |φ| < 1 in order
to make sure that τt is stationary. The analogous assumption for model (4) is that
the parameter of the lagged dependent variable is smaller than one in absolute
value.
3.2 Econometric issues
Since the estimation of models (1) to (3) is straightforward, we focus on the econo-
metric issues when estimating the dynamic models displayed as Equations (4) and
(5). Unfortunately, we are not aware of an estimation approach for unbalanced
panels solving all identiﬁcation problems in a dynamic model accounting for both
ﬁxed and spatial eﬀects. The ﬁrst thing to note is that for ﬁnite T the ﬁxed eﬀects
12(FE) estimator is not consistent in autoregressive panel data models. However, as
ﬁrst discussed by Nickell (1981) for the case of the autoregressive model without
a spatial eﬀect, the bias diminishes as T grows, and the same holds for the more
general model with cross-sectional dependence (Korniotis, 2008). Since we are us-
ing a long unbalanced panel with 24 out of 32 countries contributing a minimum
of 15 annual observations to the data set,4 we expect the Nickel-bias of the FE
estimator to be modest.
As alternative estimators, we considered a variety of instrumental variables (IV)
procedures to estimate dynamic panel data models in the tradition of Anderson
and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond (1991) as well as FE estimators with
bias correction as suggested by Bruno (2005) and Korniotis (2008). Noting that
IV estimators are biased in ﬁnal samples, choosing between Anderson and Hsiao
(1982) or Arellano and Bond (1991) as opposed to the FE estimator boils down to
an eﬃciency tradeoﬀ between estimators known to be biased. Generally, we found
that, after taking ﬁrst diﬀerences to wipe out the country-speciﬁc eﬀects, using
τ−i,t−2 as an IV for neighbors taxes, ∆τ−i,t−1, seemed to work reasonably well.
However, neither lagged tax rates nor lagged diﬀerences performed suﬃciently well
as IVs for ∆τi,t−1, leaving us with ﬁrst-stage F-statistics well below 10. Taking
into account Monte Carlo evidence suggesting that the IV-estimators may suﬀer
from substantial bias when N is small (Judson and Owen, 1999), we came to the
conclusion that in our application the FE estimator was the better choice. Among
4The country with the fewest observations (10) is Turkey. 13 countries contribute the maxi-
mum of 23 observations.
13the bias-correction approaches, only Korniotis (2008) can deal with both a lagged
dependent variable and a spatial eﬀect. Unfortunately, the estimator can be applied
only to balanced panels and is therefore of limited interest for this study.5
Hence, after weighting all options, we selected the FE estimator as our preferred
procedure to estimate the various models presented above. With respect to model
(4), we cross-checked the results from the FE estimator with those obtained from
the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) procedure with bias correction proposed
by Bruno (2005), ﬁnding very similar results. As a robustness check for the esti-
mation of the full model (5), we also ran FE IV estimations, treating τ−i,t−1 as an
endogenous explanatory variable. For details, in particular regarding the choice of
the IVs, we refer the reader to Section 4.
3.3 Data and spatial weights
Our database covers up to 32 European countries for the period from 1983 until
2006. Basically, our sample size depends on the availability of reliable tax data.
Therefore, during the 1980s the sample consists of Western and Northern European
countries. Thereafter, the sample grows signiﬁcantly. Beginning with 1996, it
covers 32 European countries, including all current 27 EU member states. This
database constitutes by far the most extensive panel of European countries among
5We checked the performance of the Korniotis estimator on the balanced panel of those 13
European countries which are present in our data for the whole period 1983-2006. We could
not come up with a speciﬁcation showing a minimum robustness across a number of choices for
technical parameters. This does not come as a surprise given that Korniotis (2008) is an extension
of less general estimators for settings with both N and T being large.
14all existing studies on corporate tax setting. Note also that our study is the ﬁrst
one that, starting with 1992, includes an extensive number of countries in Central
and Eastern Europe.
The choice of meaningful tax measures is essential for our purpose. If governments
engage in competition for mobile capital, ﬁrms, and paper proﬁts, they should use
those tax instruments which aﬀect the behavior of the relevant economic agents.
Firms typically consider expected future tax payments rather than historical tax
payments when deciding on investments or proﬁt assignments. Therefore, we use
so-called forward-looking tax rates which convey information on expected future
tax payments. The three diﬀerent indicators are the statutory tax rate (STR), the
eﬀective marginal tax rate (EMTR), and the eﬀective average tax rate (EATR).
The STR is the simplest forward-looking indicator. However, it neglects any diﬀer-
ence in the tax base and the existence of non-income taxes. We utilize the statutory
headline tax rate of the corporate income tax adjusted to surcharges and typical
local income taxes, which are imposed on the same or a similar tax base. Eﬀective
tax rates are more complex and compress various aspects of the legal tax code at
a respective location. The underlying idea is to determine eﬀective tax levels of
a hypothetical, standardized investment project. An advantage of using eﬀective
tax rates is that several relevant components of the tax system of a given country
can be considered within one indicator. These tax measures reﬂect all relevant
income and non-income taxes imposed on corporate investments, as well as all the
rules determining the tax base such as depreciation rules. Our speciﬁcations for
15computing the eﬀective tax rates are similar to the assumptions in a comprehensive
study about company taxation by the European Commission (2001).6
Note that the STR is a good measure in cases where it is not relevant for ﬁrms
how the tax base is being determined. Therefore, it is a well-suited indicator for
competition for mobile paper proﬁts. Since the EMTR indicates the tax burden
attributable to marginal investments, this measure is relevant when countries com-
pete for marginal capital investments. Finally, the EATR is the relevant indicator
of the tax burden of proﬁtable projects that generate economic rents due to ﬁrm-
speciﬁc assets.7 Consequently, the EATR should be the relevant tax measure if
countries compete for complete ﬁrms or subsidiaries.8 Tax policies can asymmetri-
cally aﬀect these three tax measures by choosing diﬀerent tax types, statutory tax
rates and rules determining the tax base. Accordingly, governments are able to
engage in diﬀerent dimensions of tax competition. We will therefore use the STR,
the EMTR, and the EATR as alternative dependent variables.
With respect to openness, we use a common trade-based measure, namely the
sum of imports and exports divided by GDP. We also experimented with a variety
of alternative measures, among them measures related to FDI ﬂows relative to a
6The standardized project contains investments in the following ﬁve asset types: industrial
buildings, machineries, intangible assets, inventories, and ﬁnancial assets. The project is equally
ﬁnanced by retained earnings, the issue of new shares, and debt. We assume an incorporated
company. Only domestic taxes and only income and non-income taxes imposed at the corporate
level are considered. Speciﬁc property taxes on real estate and special tax regimes available only
to speciﬁc ﬁrms are not included. With regard to taxable bases, we consider the relevant rules
concerning depreciation allowances, valuation of inventories and interest deductibility in case of
debt ﬁnancing.
7As European Commission (2001), we assume a pre-tax rate of return of about 20%.
8Previous empirical studies conﬁrm that the EATR is a suitable indicator in case of location
decisions (Devereux and Griﬃth, 1998; B¨ uttner and Ruf, 2007).
16Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Deﬁnition Nob Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
STR Statutory corporate income tax rate 571 0.343 0.102 0.100 0.631
EMTR Eﬀective marginal tax rate 571 0.231 0.097 -0.196 0.507
EATR Eﬀective average tax rate 571 0.302 0.084 0.104 0.555
P
j wijSTRj Average of other countries’ STR 571 0.354 0.070 0.202 0.567
P
j wijEMTRj Average of other countries’ EMTR 571 0.238 0.066 0.011 0.475
P
j wijEATRj Average of other countries’ EATR 571 0.310 0.059 0.177 0.502
Openness Sum of exp. and imp. as % of GDP 571 0.928 0.459 0.357 3.02
PITR Personal top income tax rate 567 0.475 0.115 0.160 0.800
GDP GDP in billions (PPP) 568 306 437 4.56 2197
% young % population <15 years 571 0.186 0.031 0.135 0.324
% old % population >65 years 571 0.143 0.023 0.046 0.199
Unbalanced panel (32 countries, years 1984-2006). Tax variables based on own calculations.
Underlying tax information is from several databases provided by the International Bureau of
Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), Amsterdam, and from annual surveys by Ernst&Young, PwC
and KPMG. Information on FDI ﬂows is from the World Development Indicators of the World
Bank. The other control variables are from Eurostat and the World Development Indicators of
the World Bank.
country’s GDP as well as the Chinn-Ito ﬁnancial openness index. We comment on
the performance of these alternative measures in the results section.
Table 1 depicts descriptive statistics for the tax data as well as the explanatory
variables discussed above.
With regard to the spatial weights, note ﬁrst that when estimating Equation (5)
the weights wij have to be treated as predetermined. This poses the question of
how to specify a metric that provides us with suitable weights. Previous studies of
international tax competition have extensively employed uniform weights, which
put equal weight on each foreign country in computing the average tax rate of
other countries (Devereux et al., 2008; Redoano, 2007). One conceptual problem
of uniform weights is that for N → ∞,
P
j wijτj,t−1 becomes perfectly collinear to
a common period eﬀect. Thus, in general, with uniform weights we cannot identify
17the tax competition eﬀect separately from a common period-speciﬁc shock. The
same argument holds if other countries’ tax rates are weighted by some country
characteristic such as GDP or population. Since common period-speciﬁc shocks
such as, for instance, changing expectations regarding the world business cycle,
may be important factors shaping governments’ tax policies, we are well advised to
choose weights which allow for a separate identiﬁcation of tax competition eﬀects.
Given the concerns mentioned above, we deﬁne weights that are based on geo-
graphical distance. The literature provides clear-cut evidence for a negative eﬀect
of distance on FDI (e.g., see Carr et al., 2001). In case of investment decisions,
geographical distance drives transportation costs for produced goods but also infor-
mation costs (Portes and Rey, 2005). Geographical distance should also negatively
aﬀect pure paper-proﬁt shifting since the underlying intra-ﬁrm transactions such
as intra-ﬁrm trade should be inversely related to geographical distance as well.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that governments perceive tax policies of
immediate neighbors to be more relevant than tax policies of more distant countries.
Moreover, to ensure that the contribution of very small countries like Luxembourg
or Malta is discounted relative to big countries like France or Germany (holding
distance ﬁxed), we adjust the weights by country size in terms of total population.
Denoting the geographical distance between countries i and j (in kilometers) by dij
and total population by pop (in millions), we operationalize the above arguments




k6=i ln(popk + 1)/d2
ik
∀ j 6= i. (8)
4 Results
We will discuss the ﬁndings from estimations of the various models for the statutory
tax rate ﬁrst. Later on, we will report corresponding results for the EMTR and
the EATR, and we will also discuss a number of robustness checks and tests.
4.1 Main results
The results from estimations of the models (1) and (2) using the statutory tax
rate as the dependent variable are reported in Table 2. Column (1) has only a
linear time trend (apart from a full series of country-speciﬁc eﬀects). The result
shows that, assuming that statutory tax rates in the period under consideration
are driven by a common linear time trend, governments cut the statutory tax
rate by one percentage point per year on average. Column (2) allows for more
ﬂexibility in common time eﬀects by using a full series of year eﬀects instead of a
time trend. Although the model is certainly simplistic, it is revealing to see the
year eﬀects become signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero starting in 1989. By then, the
average government had reduced its statutory rate by almost 5.8 percentage points
relative to the level in 1984. By 1993, the average rate had been lowered by 10.7
19Table 2: The impact of common eﬀects and openness on statutory tax rates, 1984-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Openness - - -0.095? (0.049) -0.124?? (0.053)
Time trend -0.010??? (0.001) - -0.008??? (0.001) -
Year eﬀects:
1985 - 0.000 (0.009) - 0.006 (0.009)
1986 - -0.015 (0.014) - -0.007 (0.014)
1987 - -0.021 (0.016) - -0.024 (0.017)
1988 - -0.024 (0.017) - -0.028 (0.017)
1989 - -0.058?? (0.023) - -0.060?? (0.023)
1990 - -0.071??? (0.022) - -0.064??? (0.022)
1991 - -0.090??? (0.028) - -0.084??? (0.029)
1992 - -0.086??? (0.029) - -0.090??? (0.029)
1993 - -0.107??? (0.029) - -0.104??? (0.030)
1994 - -0.112??? (0.030) - -0.110??? (0.030)
1995 - -0.122??? (0.029) - -0.114??? (0.030)
1996 - -0.122??? (0.029) - -0.115??? (0.029)
1997 - -0.120??? (0.029) - -0.110??? (0.029)
1998 - -0.130??? (0.028) - -0.114??? (0.028)
1999 - -0.139??? (0.028) - -0.122??? (0.027)
2000 - -0.153??? (0.028) - -0.136??? (0.027)
2001 - -0.168??? (0.028) - -0.137??? (0.028)
2002 - -0.182??? (0.028) - -0.152??? (0.028)
2003 - -0.191??? (0.028) - -0.167??? (0.027)
2004 - -0.203??? (0.028) - -0.180??? (0.027)
2005 - -0.217??? (0.029) - -0.189??? (0.028)
2006 - -0.222??? (0.029) - -0.189??? (0.029)
N 571 571 569 569
R2 (within) 0.547 0.561 0.565 0.587
Fixed eﬀects estimation using unbalanced panel of 32 countries. Standard errors (robust to
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ? 10%, ?? 5%, ??? 1%.
percentage points. By the end of the time period under consideration, the average
accumulated cut in statutory rates was 22.2 percentage points. Note that the R2
from the mean-deviated regression attains the somewhat remarkable values of 0.55
in Column (1) and 0.56 in Column (2). Hence, after netting out pure cross-country
variation, a linear trend or a series of year eﬀects is able to explain between 55 and
56 percent of the remaining variation in statutory tax rates.
Columns (3) and (4) add our trade-based openness measure. Assuming that model
(2) is appropriate to explain corporate tax setting in Europe, the estimated coeﬃ-
20Table 3: Dynamic estimation with additional country characteristics, 1984-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged own tax rate - - 0.724??? 0.729???
(0.030) (0.033)
Openness -0.046 -0.072?? -0.005 -0.012
(0.031) (0.035) (0.017) (0.019)
Top income tax rate 0.408?? 0.364?? 0.161?? 0.136??
(0.161) (0.159) (0.066) (0.064)
log(GDP) 0.038 0.067 -0.000 0.016
(0.033) (0.043) (0.010) (0.016)
% young 1.35??? 1.55??? 0.448??? 0.457??
(0.408) (0.425) (0.160) (0.188)
% old 2.50??? 2.64??? 0.478 0.538?
(0.827) (0.820) (0.293) (0.285)
Linear time trend -0.009??? - -0.001 -
(0.002) (0.0007)
Period eﬀects no yes no yes
N 560 560 548 548
R2 (within) 0.667 0.579 0.865 0.871
Fixed eﬀects estimation using unbalanced panel of 32 countries. Standard errors (robust to
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ? 10%, ?? 5%, ??? 1%.
cient from the model including year eﬀects indicates that an increase in the com-
bined share of exports and imports in GDP by one percentage point would trigger
a cut in the statutory tax rate by about 0.12 percentage points. We note, however,
that the inclusion of openness does only marginally improve the model’s R2.
Table 3 shows the results for estimations of model (3) (ﬁrst two columns) and
model (4) (last two columns). We note that adding our set of control variables
greatly reduces the coeﬃcient of openness. If we account for common time eﬀects
by a linear trend, it is no longer statistically diﬀerent from zero. With a full series
of year eﬀects, we ﬁnd it to be -0.072 (compared to -0.124 without controls) and
still signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Among the controls, we ﬁnd our expectations
conﬁrmed by noting positive coeﬃcients of the top income tax rate, the percentage
young and the percentage old.
21Returning to our key variables of interest, Columns (3) and (4) show that once
we account for a lagged dependent variable, the impact of openness is reduced
to virtually zero. Irrespective of whether we include a trend or year eﬀects, we
do not ﬁnd any evidence supporting the notion that a country’s openness aﬀects
the choice of the statutory tax rate. This ﬁnding might be questioned as being
potentially driven by the speciﬁc measure for openness used here. To check the
robustness of the ﬁndings reported in Columns (3) and (4), we repeated both
estimations with ﬁve alternative openness measures: the share of inward FDI ﬂows
in GDP, the corresponding share for outward FDI, the combined share of inward
and outward FDI, a Feldstein-Horioka type measure relating the diﬀerence between
savings and investment (in absolute value) to output (GDP), and the Chinn-Ito
index of ﬁnancial openness. We did not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of any
of these openness measures. Moreover, the trade-based measure was the only one
that proved to be signiﬁcant in the model reported in Column (2).
As expected, the lagged dependent variable proves to be highly signiﬁcant. With
a coeﬃcient of ˆ λ = 0.729 in Column (4) of Table 3, the long-run eﬀect of changes
in the control variables can be computed by multiplying the estimated coeﬃcients
with 1/(1 − ˆ λ) = 3.69. For example, the long-run eﬀect of a permanent reduction
in the percentage of young by one percentage point on the statutory tax rate is
predicted to be -1.69 percentage points.
It is also worth noting that the period eﬀects in speciﬁcation (4) are still signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero starting from the year 1989 (results not reported). Hence,
22even in a dynamic model using the tax rate from t−1 among the explanatory vari-
ables to capture the sluggish adjustment of taxes over time, we are well advised to
account for common period-speciﬁc eﬀects.
The next step is to allow for both openness and strategic tax competition to af-
fect the statutory rate. Before turning to the full dynamic model, it is instructive
to consider a static equation again. In Table 4, Columns (1) and (2), we report
estimations with the lagged tax rate of neighbors and the trade-based openness
measure.9 Both variables are statistically diﬀerent from zero in both estimations
and carry the expected sign. However, while the tax competition eﬀect is robust
to the inclusion of our control variables, the coeﬃcient of openness drops from
-0.121 to -0.058, and is now only weakly signiﬁcant. The diﬀerence between the
tax competition and the globalization eﬀect becomes even more striking once we
include the lagged dependent variable, arriving at the full dynamic model displayed
as Equation (5). Shown in Column (3), we note that the estimate for λ is again
highly signiﬁcant and that the eﬀect of the lagged tax rate of neighbors is positive
and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve percent level, while the null of open-
ness having no impact on statutory tax rates cannot be rejected at any reasonable
level of signiﬁcance. Finally, with respect to the controls, our ﬁndings qualitatively
match those obtained before.
To interpret our ﬁndings in more depth, it is useful to evaluate the dynamic model
in terms of the long-run eﬀects of changes in exogenous components. This is po-
9Interestingly, the period eﬀects become all insigniﬁcant once we account for tax competition.
We report only estimations with a full series of year eﬀects in Table 4. The results do not vary
in any signiﬁcant way if we capture common time eﬀects by a linear trend.
23Table 4: The role of tax competition, openness, and common eﬀects, 1984-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged own tax rate - - 0.716??? 0.708???
(0.034) (0.032)
Lagged tax rate of neighbors 0.475?? 0.440??? 0.095?? 0.155?
(0.186) (0.127) (0.041) (0.091)
Openness -0.121?? -0.058? -0.010 -0.009
(0.052) (0.030) (0.020) (0.019)
Top income tax rate - 0.363?? 0.139?? 0.142??
(0.159) (0.065) (0.060)
log(GDP) - 0.011 0.005 -0.001
(0.040) (0.014) (0.016)
% young - 1.33??? 0.437?? 0.425??
(0.423) (0.194) (0.192)
% old - 2.37??? 0.523? 0.513?
(0.815) (0.288) (0.277)
Period eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Estimator FE FE FE FE IV
N 552 548 548 548
R2 (within) 0.611 0.697 0.872 -
First stage F-Statistic - - - 81.0
Shea Partial R2 - - - 0.454
Estimation based on unbalanced panel of 32 countries. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation) in parentheses. Column (4) treats lagged tax rate of neighbors as
endogenous, IVs are neighbors’ %young, neighbors’ %old, and neighbors’ interaction between
distance to Eastern Europe and count for post-1990 years (see text for details). Signiﬁcance
levels: ? 10%, ?? 5%, ??? 1%.
tentially much more involved than in a dynamic framework without cross-sectional
dependence. To keep things as simple as possible, consider a case with just two
countries, i = 1,2, and a single exogenous country characteristic, x. Using the no-
tation of Section 3, we then have spatial weights w11 = w22 = 0 and w12 = w21 = 1.
With bars now indicating that the various variables have attained their equilibrium
levels, the steady-state tax rate of country 1 is determined by
¯ y1 =
φ¯ y2 + β¯ x1
1 − λ
.
24Substituting for ¯ y2 and solving for ¯ y1 provides us with
¯ y1 =
β(1 − λ)
(1 − λ)2 − φ2 ¯ x1 +
βφ
(1 − λ)2 − φ2 ¯ x2.
The latter equation shows that the eﬀect of changes in exogenous country charac-
teristics on equilibrium tax rates depends on multipliers comprising the coeﬃcients
λ and φ. For changes in ¯ x1, the multiplier is ¯ x1, (1−λ)/((1−λ)2−φ2). Substituting
the estimated coeﬃcients from Column (3) of Table 4 yields a value of 3.96. The
multiplier for changes in ¯ x2 is φ/((1−λ)2 −φ2), which is estimated to give a value
of 1.33. Hence, our estimations imply that permanent changes of relevant country
characteristics have long-run eﬀects on corporate taxes which are a multiple of the
direct eﬀects. For instance, if applied to the stylized two-country example, our
model would predict a decrease of the percentage young by one percentage point
in one country to have the following eﬀects: in the short run, the statutory tax rate
in the aﬀected country will be cut by 0.44 percentage points. In the long run, the
country is predicted to reduce its tax rate by 1.73 percentage points. Moreover,
our model predicts also that, through the tax cuts in the aﬀected country, the
tax-reducing eﬀect of the original shock is transmitted to the other country. In the
long run, this country will reduce its own tax rate by 0.58 percentage points.
Provided that the dynamics of corporate tax setting are adequately captured in
our model allowing for common time eﬀects, openness, and tax competition, the
evidence suggests a straightforward answer to the question about the determinants
of the steady decline of corporate taxes in Europe. First of all, once we net out time-
25constant country characteristics and common period-speciﬁc eﬀects, our ﬁndings do
not support the notion that diﬀerences in terms of economic or ﬁnancial openness
aﬀect the tax setting of countries in Europe. We do ﬁnd, however, a strong impact
of strategic tax competition, where governments adjust their statutory tax rate
towards levels chosen in neighboring countries.
Our results point to moderate short-run eﬀects of tax competition: with the coef-
ﬁcient of the tax competition eﬀect being estimated as 0.095, the national govern-
ments are estimated to react to tax policies in other countries by directly compen-
sating less than 10 percent of changes among competing countries. The sluggish
adjustment of tax rates over time, however, leads to substantial long-run mul-
tipliers of changes in exogenous country characteristics. Moreover, our ﬁndings
suggest that even if exogenous changes are limited to some countries, the interplay
of tax competition and the dynamics of corporate tax setting has the potential of
signiﬁcantly aﬀecting long-run equilibrium tax rates in all countries.
4.2 Robustness and extensions
4.2.1 Instrumenting neighbors’ taxes
The ﬁrst robustness check is concerned with the endogeneity of neighbors’ taxes.
While treating the lagged dependent variable as an exogenous variable seems to
be less of a problem given the considerable length of the panel, the endogeneity
of the lagged tax rate of neighbors is driven also by cross-sectional dependence.
26We have constructed three IVs for neighbors’ taxes and report a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) estimation in Column (4) of Table 4. The IVs are lagged averages of
neighbors’ characteristics, constructed by applying the same set of spatial weights
that was used to compute the average tax among neighbors. We select two ar-
guably exogenous characteristics that are consistently found to be strongly related
to taxes, namely the percentage of young and the percentage of elderly people. A
third IV makes use of the fact that the breakdown of the communist regimes in
Eastern Europe in 1989 and the fall of the iron curtain had a diﬀerential eﬀect on
Western European countries in terms of the degree of low-wage competition from
Eastern Europe (Overesch and Rincke, 2009). We exploit the integration shock
by constructing a count variable measuring the distance to Eastern Europe, ci,
deﬁned as the number of countries one would have to drive through when starting
in a given country’s capital and heading to the physically closest capital in Eastern
Europe,10 and then deﬁning
INT1990it =

   
   
0 if t < 1990
−(5 − ci)(t − 1989) if t >= 1990
While INT1990it for a country like Portugal with c = 5 is ﬂat, it assigns a scheme
with a negative linear slope over time for years after 1989 to all countries closer
to Eastern Europe. However, while the slope will be minus one for Spain (with
c = 4), it will be minus three for a country like Germany (with c = 2), capturing
10In case of countries not belonging to continental Europe we count the number of countries
on a straight line connecting the country’s capital and the closest capital in Eastern Europe.
27the notion that the potential of the 1990 revolution in Eastern Europe to aﬀect
national tax policies in other countries decreases in the count c. Taking averages
across neighbors (again using the spatial weights) provides us with a variable that
is arguably exogenous to a country’s own statutory tax rate but should be strongly
correlated with actual tax rates of neighbors.
The results for the 2SLS regression generally support the ﬁndings from the FE
estimation of the dynamic model. It turns out that the explanatory power of the
IVs in the ﬁrst-stage regression is impressive: the F-statistic for the IVs is 81.0, and
the Shea’s partial R2 equals 0.454. While all other coeﬃcients are almost identical
to those reported in Column (3), the tax competition eﬀect is now estimated to
be 0.155 compared to 0.095 before. This suggests that the FE estimation of the
dynamic model underestimates the tax competition eﬀect.11
4.2.2 Eﬀective tax rates
As discussed in Section 3, there are diﬀerent ways to measure the tax burden on
corporate income, with the various measures being linked to diﬀerent potential
dimensions of tax competition. Empirical studies dealing with the behavioral re-
sponse to tax incentives suggest that multinational ﬁrms allocate proﬁts according
to diﬀerences in statutory tax rates (Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven,
2008). In contrast, eﬀective tax rates are relevant if governments compete for ﬁrms
11While using INT1990 as an additional IV improves the performance of the ﬁrst-stage re-
gression, our main result holds if we drop the average of INT1990 across neighbors from the list
of IVs. The estimate for the tax competition eﬀect becomes 0.197 (0.104), with values for the
F-statistic of 28.7 and Shea’s partial R2 of 0.327.
28and capital investment. For instance, it may be in the interest of countries to com-
pete for multinational investment if this raises the net value of domestic production
(Haaland and Wooton, 1999). Previous empirical work suggests that the EATR
rather than the EMTR aﬀects location decisions of multinationals (Devereux and
Griﬃth, 1998; B¨ uttner and Ruf, 2007).
Table 5 extends our analysis by reporting a selection of speciﬁcations for the EMTR
and the EATR. Note that all regressions account for a full series of year eﬀects.
We ﬁnd a negative impact of openness on the EMTR in a speciﬁcation without
any other explanatory variables, but the estimated coeﬃcient becomes insigniﬁcant
once we account for any additional regressor. However, the tax competition eﬀect
is insigniﬁcant, too, irrespective of whether we use the FE or the FE IV estimator.
Hence, once we net out time-constant country characteristics and allow for common
time eﬀects, we do not ﬁnd any evidence for the EMTR to be aﬀected by openness
in general or tax competition in particular.
With respect to the EATR, our ﬁndings are pretty similar. Once we allow for
additional regressors, openness is not systematically related to the EATR. As long
as we rely on the FE estimator, the tax competition eﬀect is positive and highly
signiﬁcant and in a similar range as the corresponding eﬀect for the statutory rate.
However, once we treat neighbors’ taxes as an endogenous regressor, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that a country’s own EATR and the average rate among
neighbors are unrelated.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30that corporate tax rates do not seem to be driven by openness. Moreover, it
provides some support for the notion that governments compete for mobile ﬁrms,
but it does not point to competition for marginal investments.
4.2.3 Alternative spatial metrics
As discussed above, using uniform weights as much of the previous literature on
European tax competition is problematic as the tax competition eﬀect cannot be
identiﬁed separately from common period eﬀects. Contiguity-based weights are
not applicable without further assumptions because many countries in Europe are
islands. Using some inverse function of distance this seems to be a natural choice
for our application. We experimented with a number of alternative speciﬁcations,
varying both the role of distance and the weighting by country size. Quite generally,
we found our results to be very robust to such changes. For instance, if we drop
population as a measure for country size from Equation (9), our ﬁndings are almost
unchanged. The coeﬃcients for the lagged tax rate of neighbors and openness in
Table 4, respectively, change to 0.480 (0.197) and -0.120 (0.052) in Column (1), to
0.439 (0.150) and -0.057 (0.031) in Column (2), to 0.108 (0.040) and -0.009 (0.020)
in Column (3), and to 0.151 (0.087) and -0.008 (0.019) in Column (4). Based on
the extensive search over a number of reasonable spatial metrics, we are sure that
our ﬁndings are not speciﬁc to the chosen speciﬁcation of the weights.
315 Conclusion
Since the mid-eighties, European countries have signiﬁcantly lowered their statu-
tory and eﬀective tax rates on corporate income. We have analyzed to what degree
globalization as well as tax competition have contributed to this decline. Our em-
pirical analysis is based on a broad sample covering up to 32 European countries
for the period from 1984 until 2006. In contrast to previous studies which focused
either on economic openness or on tax competition and made a number of restric-
tive assumptions on how to account for common period-speciﬁc eﬀects, we estimate
a series of alternative models for the setting of corporate tax rates.
Our results diﬀer from previous work in several important respects. First of all,
in contrast with several previous studies, our ﬁndings suggest that the increased
economic and ﬁnancial openness of countries does not contribute much to explain-
ing the signiﬁcant decline of corporate tax rates. Secondly, we ﬁnd strong support
for direct tax competition eﬀects among countries with respect to statutory tax
rates. In contrast, we ﬁnd only weak evidence for competition over eﬀective average
and no evidence for interdependence of eﬀective marginal tax rates. This relates
our results to diﬀerent dimensions of tax competition and supports the view that
countries compete for paper proﬁts and, to some extent, for ﬁrms rather than for
marginal investments. In contrast to previous studies, we derive this result while
allowing for a dynamic adjustment of tax rates, for general period-speciﬁc eﬀects,
and using a spatial metric that assigns to each country a speciﬁc set of neighbors.
All this is done to make sure that our estimate of the tax competition eﬀect does
32not pick up common period-speciﬁc eﬀects.
While this is not the focus of this study, our estimations also show that once the
dependence of tax rates over time and country-speciﬁc eﬀects are controlled for,
often discussed country characteristics such as GDP are not systematically related
to corporate tax rates.
Taken together, our results contribute to a better understanding of the ongoing
decline of corporate tax rates in Europe by showing the importance of both the
direct interactions among governments and the dynamics of corporate tax poli-
cies. Most importantly, our ﬁndings suggest that the pronounced downward trend
of corporate taxes cannot be explained by the presence of tax competition alone.
Rather, it is the interplay of direct tax competition eﬀects and indirect eﬀects
that work through the sluggish adjustment of the key parameters of national tax
systems over time. The combination of tax competition eﬀects and dynamic mul-
tipliers implies signiﬁcant long-run eﬀects of changes in exogenous determinants of
corporate tax rates on overall tax levels. One of the consequences may be that even
past shocks like, for instance, the integration of the former communistic countries
in Eastern Europe, may aﬀect corporate tax levels for many years to come.
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